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Abstract. We present a general framework to model strategic aspects
and stable and fair resource allocations in networks via variants and
generalizations of path coalitional games. In these games, a coalition of
edges or vertices is successful if it can enable an s-t path. We present
polynomial-time algorithms to compute and verify least core payoffs
of cost-based generalizations of path coalitional games and their duals,
thereby settling a number of open problems. The least core payoffs of
path coalitional games are completely characterized and a polynomial-
time algorithm for computing the nucleolus of edge path coalitional
games on undirected series-parallel graphs is presented.
1 Introduction
We consider simple coalitional games called path coalitional games, in particu-
lar Edge Path Coalitional Games (EPCGs) and Vertex Path Coalitional Games
(VPCGs). In these games, the players control the edges and the vertices, re-
spectively, and a coalition of players wins if it enables a path from the source
s to the sink t and loses otherwise. Both of these coalitional games are natural
representations, for which solution concepts such as the Shapley value or the
nucleolus represent the amount of payoff the respective edges or vertices deserve
for enabling a path from s to t. The payoff can indicate the importance of the
players or the proportional resource, profit, maintenance or security allocation
required at the respective nodes and vertices. This kind of stability analysis is
especially crucial if the underlying graph represents a logistics, communication,
military, supply-chain or information network [3, 12]. We study the computa-
tional complexity of computing important cooperative game theoretic solutions
of path coalitional games.
Path coalitional games also have a natural correspondence with two-person
zero-sum noncooperative games. In such games, which we term as path intercept
games, there are two players, the interceptor and the passer. The problem is to
maximize the probability of intercepting a strategically chosen path in an undi-
rected graph. We refer to the path intercept games as Edge Path Noncooperative
Games (EPNGs) and Vertex Path Noncooperative Games (VPNGs). The pure
strategies of the interceptor are the edges E (or vertices V ) and the set of pure
strategies of the passer is the set P which contains all paths from vertex s to
vertex t. If the edge (or vertex) used by the interceptor intersects with the cho-
sen path, then the interceptor wins and gets payoff 1. Otherwise, the interceptor
loses and gets payoff 0. Thus, the value of the game is the greatest probability
that the interceptor can guarantee for successfully intercepting the chosen path.
The area of algorithmic cooperative game theory is beset with negative com-
putational results (see e.g., [5, 7, 10]). In this paper, we present positive al-
gorithmic results for cost-based generalizations of path coalitional games and
their duals. The cost-based generalization of a simple game is a rich and widely-
applicable model. For example in the case of edge path coalitional games, each
edge charges a certain cost for its services being utilized. A coalition of edges
gets a fixed reward for enabling an s-t path. It is then natural to examine payoffs
which are fair and stable and also manage to transport goods from s to t [8]. The
cost-based generalizations of path coalitional games have significance in logis-
tics, planning and operations research. Similarly, the cost-based generalizations
of duals of path coalitional games have natural importance in proposing stable
reward schemes to protect strategic assets or blocking intruders in a network.
Contribution:
– We use dualization and cost-based generalization to provide a unifying way
to model s-t connectivity. In doing so, we also identify some interesting
connections between coalitional game theory and network interdiction.
– For the cost-based generalization of path coalitional games and their duals
we present the first polynomial-time algorithms to compute and verify least
core payoffs. Interestingly, the problem of computing the least core of the
dual of vertex path coalitional game was (wrongly) claimed to be NP-hard [3]
and the problem of computing the least core of cost-based generalization of
edge path coalitional game was conjectured to be NP-hard (page 65, [12]).
– We present an algorithmic technique to compute least core payoffs for cost-
based generalizations of simple games in any representation. As a corollary,
it is shown that there exist polynomial-time algorithms to compute the least
core payoffs of cost-based generalizations of spanning connectivity games and
weighted voting games with bounded weights and costs.
– The least core payoffs of simple path coalitional games are characterized
and purely combinatorial polynomial-time algorithms to compute a least
core payoff are presented.
– The nucleolus is a solution concept which is notoriously hard to compute for
most interesting coalitional games. A polynomial-time algorithm to compute
the nucleolus of edge path coalitional games for undirected series-parallel
graphs is presented.
2 Related work
Network interdiction is the general framework in which weakening of a network
by an adversary or fortification of a network by defenders is considered [18].
Within this body of literature, shortest path interdiction (in which an adversary
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wants to maximize the length of the s-t shortest path in a directed network) is
related to our setting of s-t path coalitional games. Whereas all the variants of
shortest path interdiction problem are NP-hard [10], we present positive com-
putational results.
While Vertex Path Noncooperative Games (VPNGs) have not been consid-
ered in the interdiction literature (to the best of our knowledge), Edge Path Non-
cooperative Games (EPNGs) is equivalent to the two player zero sum games con-
sidered in [20]. Washburn and Wood [20] studied maxmin strategies in EPNGs.
Our cooperative game formulation helps us in proposing equilibrium refinements
such as the nucleolus (which corresponds to a unique refinement of the maxmin
strategy of the corresponding path intercept games) and other cooperative-game
solution concepts such as the Shapley value. The coalitional model, especially
the cost-based generalizations, helps us reason about more elaborate security
settings in which incentives, money, and cooperation of agents is involved. The
comparison between a simple coalitional game and its natural noncooperative
version is similar in spirit to [1] where spanning trees are considered.
The general definition of cost-based generalization of a simple game is in-
spired by Fragnelli et al. [8] and Bachrach and Porat [3] where cost-based ver-
sions of specific graph-based simple games are considered. Fragnelli et al. [8]
examined conditions for the non-emptiness of the core of ‘shortest path games’
(which are equivalent to cost-based generalization of EPCGs). However, com-
putational problems such as computing a least core payoff were not considered.
Different variants of EPCGs were considered under the umbrella of ‘shortest
path games’ in [12] but either the complexity of core-based relaxations is not
examined or the complexity of computing least core solutions was left open and
in fact conjectured to be computationally hard (page 65, [12]). Similarly, in [3],
it is claimed that the least core of the dual of VPCGs is NP-hard to compute.
We disprove the claim in [3] and present a polynomial-time algorithm to solve
a generalization of the same problem for this game as well as three other games
on any graph.
A variant of EPCGs was also considered in [13] but the focus was on strategy-
proof mechanisms rather than stability issues. Deng et al. [6] consider a different
type of s-t connectivity game which is balanced.
The s-t path connectivity setting also has natural links with network relia-
bility where the goal is to compute the probability that there exists a connected
path. However the network reliability literature does not consider strategic set-
tings and certainly has no equivalent concepts such as the least core and the
nucleolus etc.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we first define the path coalitional games and path intercept
games and then consider suitable game-theoretic solution concepts for these
games.
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3.1 Games
We begin with the formal definition of a coalitional game.
Definition 1 (Coalitional games). A coalitional game is a pair (N, v) where
N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of players and v : 2N → R+ is a characteristic or
valuation function that associates with each coalition S ⊆ N a payoff v(S) where
v(∅) = 0.3 A coalitional game (N, v) is monotonic when it satisfies the property
that v(S) ≤ v(T ) if S ⊆ T .
Throughout the paper, when we refer to a coalitional game, we assume such a
coalitional game with transferable utility. For the sake of brevity, we will some-
times refer to the game (N, v) as simply v.
Definition 2 (Simple game). A simple game is a monotonic coalitional game
(N, v) with v : 2N → {0, 1} such that v(∅) = 0 and v(N) = 1. A coalition S ⊆ N
is winning if v(S) = 1 and losing if v(S) = 0. A minimal winning coalition of a
simple game v is a winning coalition in which defection of any player makes the
coalition losing.
We now define the following two path coalitional games.
Definition 3 (Path coalitional games). For an unweighted di-
rected/undirected graph, G = (V ∪ {s, t}, E),
– the corresponding Edge Path Coalitional Game (EPCG) is a simple coali-
tional game (N, v) such that N = E and for a S ⊆ N , v(S) = 1 if and only
if S admits an s-t path.
– the corresponding Vertex Path Coalitional Game (VPCG) is a simple coali-
tional game (N, v) such that N = V and for a S ⊆ N , v(S) = 1 if and only
if S admits an s-t path.
Definition 4 (Dual of a game). For a game G = (N, v), the corresponding
dual game GD = (N, vD) can be defined in the following way: vD(S) = v(N)−
v(N \ S) for all S ⊆ N .
For both EPCG and VPCG, the corresponding duals EPCGD and V PCGD
can be defined. It will be seen that V PCGD is equivalent to a well-studied
coalitional game.
For a simple game, we can define a game which is the cost-based generaliza-
tion.
Definition 5 (Cost-based generalization). For a given simple game G =
(N, v) we can define a cost-based generalization C-G = (N, vc) based on cost
vector c = (c1, . . . , c|N |) ∈ R+
|N | and reward r ∈ R+. For a coalition S ⊆ N ,
the value of the vc(S) = r−minS′⊆S,v(S′)=1(
∑
i∈S′ ci) if v(S) = 1 and v
c(S) = 0
if v(S) = 0.
3 Throughout the paper, we assume 0 ∈ R+.
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The intuition of a cost-based generalization is that each player demands some
cost for its services being utilized and a coalition of players S get a reward r
only if it is winning and gets the job done. The coalition also incurs a cost of
minS′⊆S,v(S′)=1(
∑
i∈S′ ci) when it pools resources to get the job done. Based
on this formulation, we can define Edge Path Coalitional Games with costs C-
EPCG and Vertex Path coalitional games with costs, C-VPCG. It is easy to see
that for a game C-G, if r = 1 and the costs are all zero, then C-G is equivalent
to G.
Observation 1. C-ESPG is equivalent to the value shortest path game (VSPG)
in [12]. V PCGD is equivalent to the simple path disruption game in [3].
We now define the following two path intercept games.
Definition 6 (Path intercept games). For an unweighted directed graph,
G = (V ∪{s, t}, E), the corresponding Edge Path Noncooperative Game (EPNG)
is a noncooperative game with two players, the interceptor and the passer. The
pure strategies of the interceptor are the edges E and the pure strategies of the
passer is set P which contains all paths from vertex s to vertex t. If the edge
used by the interceptor intersects with the chosen path, then the interceptor wins
and gets payoff 1. Otherwise it loses and gets payoff 0.
Vertex Path Noncooperative Games (VPNGs) have an analogous definition
to EPNGs except that the pure strategies of the interceptor are the vertices V
and that if the vertex used by the interceptor intersects with the chosen path,
then the interceptor wins and gets payoff 1.
Both EPCG and VPNG can be generalized to the case with detection prob-
abilities where the probability that the passer moving through edge e (or vertex
v) will be detected if the interceptor inspects e (or v) is pe (or pv respectively).
3.2 Cooperative Solutions
A cooperative game solution consists of a distribution of the value of the grand
coalition over the players. Formally speaking, a solution associates with each
cooperative game (N, v) a set of payoff vectors (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ RN such that∑
i∈N xi = v(N), where xi denotes player i’s share of v(N). Such efficient payoff
vectors are also called preimputations. As such, solution concepts formalize the
notions of fair and stable payoff vectors. In what follows, we use notation similar
to that of Elkind et al. [7].
Given a cooperative game (N, v) and payoff vector x = (x1, ..., xn), the excess
of a coalition S with respect to x is defined by
e(x, S) = x(S)− v(S),
where x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. We are now in a position to define one of the most
fundamental solution concepts of cooperative game theory, viz., the core.
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Definition 7 (Core). A payoff vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) is in the core of a
cooperative game (N, v) if and only for all S ⊆ N , e(x, S) ≥ 0.
A core payoff vector guarantees that each coalition gets at least what it could
gain on its own. The core is a desirable solution concept, but, unfortunately it is
empty for many games. Games which have a non-empty core are called balanced.
The possibility of the core being empty led to the development of the ǫ-core [17]
and the least core [11].
Definition 8 (Least core). For ǫ > 0, a payoff vector x is in the ǫ-core if for
all S ⊆ N , e(x, S) ≥ −ǫ. The payoff vector x is in the least core if it is in the
ǫ-core for the smallest ǫ for which the ǫ-core is non-empty. We will denote by
−ǫ1(v), the minimum excess of any least core payoff vector of (N, v).
It is easy to see from the definition of the least core, that it is the solution
of the following linear program (LP):
min ǫ
s.t. x(S) ≥ v(S)− ǫ for all S ⊆ N,
ǫ ≥ 0, xi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N,∑
i=1,...,n xi = v(N) .
(1)
The nucleolus is a special payoff vector which is in the core if the core is
non-empty and is otherwise a member of the least core. The excess vector of a
payoff vector x, is the vector (e(x, S1), ..., e(x, S2n)) where e(x, S1) ≤ e(x, S2) ≤
. . . ≤ e(x, S2n).
Definition 9 (Nucleolus). A payoff vector x such that xi ≥ v({i}) for all
i ∈ N and x has lexicographically the largest excess vector is called the nucleolus.
The nucleolus is unique and always exists as long as v(S) = 0 for all singleton
coalitions [15].
4 Least core of path coalitional game variants
Before considering other computational issues, we notice that the value of a
coalition in EPCGs and VPCGs can be computed in polynomial time. For a
coalition S in a EPCG/C-VPCG, use Depth First Search to check whether s
and t are connected in a graph restricted to S. If not, then v(S) = 0. Otherwise,
v(S) is equal to 1.
Our first observation is that in all games EPCG, VPCG, EPCGD and
V PCGD, the core can be empty. In fact, the following proposition characterizes
when the core of these games is non-empty:
Proposition 1. The core of
– EPCG is non-empty if and only if there exists an edge, the removal of which
disconnects s and t.
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– VPCG is non-empty if and only if there exists a vertex, the removal of which
disconnects s and t.
– EPCGD is non-empty if and only if there exists an (s, t) edge.
– (Bachrach and Porat [3]) V PCGD is non-empty if and only if there exists
a vertex x such that (s, x) and (x, t) are edges in the graph.
Proof. All cases follow directly from the fact that in a simple monotone game,
the core is non-empty if and only if there exists a vetoer, i.e., a player i ∈ N
such that v(N \ {i}) = 0 (see e.g., [7]). For the dual games, note the following.
Let (N, vd) be the dual game and let x be a player such that v(x) = 1. We want
to show that player x is a vetoer in (N, vd) i.e., vd(N \ x) = 0. We know that
v(N) = 1. Then, by definition of dual, vd(N \ x) = v(N) − v(x) = 1 − 1 = 0.
Thus x is a vetoer in (N, vd).
⊓⊔
Since the core can be empty, the least core payoff assumes more importance.
We will first present a general positive result (Theorem 1) regarding the com-
putation of least core payoff for cost-based generalizations of simple games. For
a simple game G = (N, v) and (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ R+
|N |, denote by Gx game G
in which each player i ∈ N has weight xi. Then, a minimum weight winning
coalition of Gx a winning coalition S such that x(S) is minimal.
Theorem 1. For a simple game G = (N, v), assume that there exists an algo-
rithm which for a given weight vector (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ R+
|N |, computes in polyno-
mial time a minimum weight winning coalition of Gx. Then, a least core payoff
of a cost-based generalization of G can be computed and verified in polynomial
time.
Proof. We will denote the algorithm in the statement as Algorithm A. Consider
C-G= (N, vc) be the cost-based generalization of (N, v) with associates cost
vector c = (c1, . . . , c|N |) ∈ R+
|N | and reward r ∈ R+.
In order to compute a least core payoff of C-G, we consider the least core
LP for C-G. The size of the linear program (1) is exponential in the size of
game C-G, with an inequality for every subset of players. However, this linear
program can be solved using the ellipsoid method and a separation oracle, which
verifies in polynomial time whether a solution is feasible or returns a violated
constraint [16]. We now demonstrate how algorithm A can be used to construct
the separation oracle for the least core LP of C-G.
A candidate solution for the least core payoff is an efficient payoff x =
(x1, . . . , x|N |) such that x(N) = v
c(N) = r − minS′⊆N,v(S′)=1(
∑
i∈S′ ci) = r−
weight of the minimum weight winning coalition of Gc. Since c = (c1, . . . , c|N |) ∈
R+
|N |, Algorithm A can be used to compute minS′⊆S,v(S′)=1(
∑
i∈S′ ci) and
therefore x(N). Now that x(N) is known, a separation oracle for the least core
LP considers different candidate solutions x such that x(N) is constant.
For a candidate solution x = (x1, . . . , x|N |), where x(N) = v(N) = r−
minimum cost of a winning coalition in C-G, construct the weighted function
x′ = (x′1, . . . , x
′
|N |) such that x
′
i = xi + ci for all i ∈ N . Since xi ≥ 0 and ci ≥ 0
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for all i ∈ N , x′i ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N . Therefore, we can use algorithm A to compute
a minimum weight winning coalition S∗ of Gx
′
.
Now the claim is that S∗ is a coalition with the minimum excess of C-G with
respect to payoff x and that x′(S∗) − r is the minimum of excess of game C-G
with respect to payoff x. Note that e(x, S∗) = x(S∗)−vc(S∗) ≤ x(N)−vc(S∗) =
x(N) − (r −minS′′⊆S∗,v(S′′)=1 c(S
′′)) ≤ x(N) − (r −minS′′⊆N,v(S′′)=1 c(S
′′)) =
x(N)− vc(N) = 0.
For the sake of contradiction, assume that there is a coalition S′ which has the
minimum excess with respect to x in game C-G such that S′ is not a minimum
weight winning coalition of Gx
′
. Then, either S′ is not winning or is winning
but not a minimum weight winning coalition. If S′ is losing, then e(x, S′) =
x(S′)− vc(S′) = x(S′) ≥ 0. Since e(x, S∗) ≤ 0, S′ does not have smaller excess
that S∗ in game C-G with respect to payoff x.
In the second case, assume that vc(S′) = 1 but x′(S′) > x′(S∗). Without loss
of generality, S′ is a minimal winning coalition. If it were not, then we prove
that there exists an S′′ ⊂ S′ such that S′′ is a minimal winning coalition and
e(x, S′′) ≤ e(x, S′). If v(S′′) = v(S′), then we are already done as x(S′′) ≤ x(S)′.
Assume that v(S′) < v(S′′). Then, there exists a minimal winning coalition
S′′′ ⊂ S′ such that c(S′′′) < c(S′′). But then it must be that x(S′′′) + c(S′′′) ≥
x(S′′) + c(S′′) because if it were not, then e(x, S′′′) ≤ e(x, S′′). Thus, we have
established that S′ is a minimal winning coalition without loss of generality.
Since x(S′) + c(S′) = x′(S′) > x′(S∗) = x(S∗) + c(S∗), therefore e(x, S′) =
x(S′)− (r − c(S′)) = x(S′) + c(S′)− r = x′(S′)− r > x′(S∗)− r = e(x, S∗).
We can use the known algorithm A to compute the winning coalition S∗ with
the smallest total weight x′(S∗). If we have x′(S∗) = x(S∗) + c(S∗) − r ≥ −ǫ,
then x(S) − vc(S) ≥ −ǫ for all S ⊆ N . Therefore, x is feasible. Otherwise, the
constraint x(S∗) − vc(S∗) ≥ −ǫ is violated. This completes our argument that
a polynomial-time separation oracle for the least core LP of the C-G can be
constructed.
A payoff x = (x1, . . . , x|N |) can be verified if it is in the ǫ-core by using the
separation oracle. Since the minimum excess −ǫ1 of the least core payoff can be
computed, therefore the separation oracle can also be used directly to check if
the given payoff is in the least core. ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. A least core can be computed for cost-based generalizations of the
following games: spanning connectivity games [1] and weighted voting games [7]
with bounded weights and also bounded costs.
Proof. For a spanning connectivity game G, there exists an algorithm which
for a given weight vector (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ R+
|N |, computes in polynomial time a
minimum weight winning coalition of Gx (Proposition 5, [2]).
For weighted voting games with weights represented in unary, there exists
an algorithm which for a given weight vector (x1, . . . , xN ) ∈ R+
|N |, computes in
polynomial time a minimum weight winning coalition of Gx (Theorem 5, [7]).
Since the algorithm works only for weighted voting games with small weights,
the algorithm can be used as a separation oracle for the least core of cost-based
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generalization of weighted voting games only if the associated cost vector is also
represented in unary. ⊓⊔
From the proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 it is evident that if there the
separation oracle to compute the least core LP of a simple game G can also
be used as a separation oracle to compute the least core LP of a cost-based
generalization of G. We say that the representation of a coalitional game (N, v)
is as compact as the cost function c = (c1, . . . , cN) ∈ R+
|N |, if the following
condition holds: if cardinal values used in the representations of (N, v) are in
unary, then c is also represented in unary.
Observation 2. Let G = (N, v) be the underlying simple game and C-G=
(N, vc) be the cost-based generalization of (N, v). Assume that the representation
of (N, v) is as compact as the cost function c. Then, if there exists a polynomial-
time separation oracle for the least core LP of the underlying simple game, then
a least core payoff of the cost-based generalization can be computed and verified
in polynomial time.
We now apply Theorem 1 to path coalitional games.
Theorem 2. There exist polynomial-time algorithms to compute and verify least
core payoffs of cost-based generalizations of Edge Path Coalitional Games (C-
EPCGs) and Edge Path Coalitional Games (C-EPCGs) for both directed and
undirected graphs.
Proof. We use Theorem 1 to prove the statement.
C-EPCGs: For a C-EPCG G, it is sufficient to show that for a weight vector,
x = (x1, . . . , x|E|), we can compute a minimum weight winning coalition of G
x.
Each player (edge) i has a weight xi and the minimum weight winning coalition
is an s-t simple path P with the smallest weight, that is the shortest s-t path.
Use Dijkstra’s Shortest Path Algorithm to compute the shortest path P from s
to t in graph Gx and then the minimum weight winning coalition is E(P ), the
edges used in path P .
C-VPCGs: For a C-VPCG G, it is sufficient to show that for a weight vector,
x = (x1, . . . , x|V |), we can compute a minimum weight winning coalition of G
x.
Each player (node) i has a weight xi and the minimum excess coalition is an
s-t simple path P with the smallest weight, that is the shortest vertex s-t path.
Then compute the shortest vertex weighted path P from s to t in graph Gx
and then the minimum weight winning coalition is V (P ). Dijkstra’s Shortest
Path Algorithm can be used to compute the shortest vertex weighted path as
follows. The problem can be reduced to the classic shortest path problem in the
following way: duplicate each vertex (apart from s and t) with one getting all
ingoing edges, and the other getting all the outgoing edges, add an internal edge
between them with the node weight as the edge weight. Use the algorithm to
compute the shortest vertex path P from s to t in graph Gx. ⊓⊔
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A least core payoff of a coalitional game is not necessarily a least core payoff
of the dual game. Therefore, we require new algorithms to compute the least
core of dual coalitional path games.
Theorem 3. There exist polynomial-time algorithms to compute and verify least
core payoffs of C-EPCGDs and C-V PCGDs for both directed and undirected
graphs.
Proof. We utilize Theorem 1 to prove the statement.
C-EPCGD: For a C-EPCGD G, it is sufficient to show that for a weight
vector, x = (x1, . . . , x|E|), we can compute a minimum weight winning coalition
of Gx. Each player (edge) i has a weight xi and the minimum weight winning
coalition is an s-t cut P with the smallest weight. Use the maximum network
flow algorithm (Chapter 27, [4]) to compute the minimum weight edge s-t cut C
in graph Gx. This gives us the minimal winning coalition C with the minimum
weight.
C-V PCGD: For a C-V PCGD G, it is sufficient to show that for a weight vector,
x = (x1, . . . , x|V |), we can compute a minimum weight winning coalition of
of Gx. Each player (node) i has a weight xi and the minimum weight winning
coalition is a minimum weight s-t vertex cut. Then compute the minimum weight
s-t vertex cut in graph Gx and then the minimum weight winning coalition is
V (P ). It is known that the minimum weight vertex s-t cut can be computed
in polynomial time for directed graphs by standard network-flow methods. The
network flow method to compute the minimum edge s-t cut can be used to
compute the minimum vertex s-t cut as following. The problem can be reduced
to the problem of min weight s-t edge cut of an edge weight directed graph in
the following way: duplicate each vertex (apart from s and t) with one getting
all incoming edges, and the other getting all the outgoing edges, add an internal
edge between them with the node weight as the edge weight. Set the weight of
all original edges as infinite (sufficiently large). We use existing algorithms to
compute the minimum weight vertex s-t cut to construct the separation oracle
for the C-V PCGD least core LP. ⊓⊔
We note that if instead of using s-t connectivity settings, we consider more
than two terminals then some problems such as In-ǫ-Core become NP-hard.
This follows from the fact that computing a min cut for more than two terminals
is NP-hard.
5 A closer look at path coalitional games without costs
In this section, we take a closer look at simple path coalitional games without
costs. We will refer to the minimum size of an s-t cut of a unweighted graph as
cE if we refer to edge cuts and as cV if we refer to vertex cuts. Then we have
the following theorem:
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Theorem 4 (Characterization of path coalitional games without
costs). Consider an EPCG GEPCG and a VPCG GV PCG. Then ǫ1(GEPCG) =
1 − 1/cE and ǫ1(GV PCG) = 1 − 1/cV . Moreover, there are combinatorial
polynomial-time algorithms to compute and verify a least core payoff of EPCGs
and VPCGs.
Proof. Consider an EPNG based on graph G with detection probabilities
(p1, . . . , p|E|). Let ∆(A) denote set of mixed strategies (probability distribu-
tions) on a finite set A. The equilibrium or maxmin strategies of the interceptor
are the solutions {x ∈ ∆(E) |
∑
v∈P xe · pe ≥ val(G) for all P ∈ P} to the
following linear program, which has the optimal value val(G).
max α
s.t.
∑
e∈P xe · pe ≥ α for all P ∈ P ,
x ∈ ∆(E) .
(2)
We notice that if pe = 1 for e ∈ E, then LP (2) is equivalent to the least core
LP for EPCGs. It is clear that maxmin strategy x of EPNG where pe = 1 for
all e ∈ E is equivalent to the least core payoff of EPCG corresponding to G.
LP (2) is equivalent to LP 1 in [20] if pe is set to 1 for each edge in both LPs.
This demonstrates that computing maxmin strategies of EPNG is equivalent to
computing least core payoffs of EPCGs. Washburn and Wood [20] conclude that
maxmin strategy is obtained by constructing a graph Gc
′
where c′e = 1/pe and
then computing the minimum weight s-t cut S. Each edge e ∈ S is then given
interdiction probability proportional to ce = 1/pe. It follows that if pe = 1 for
all e ∈ E, then c′e = 1/pe, and the minimum weight s-t cut S of G
c′ is simply
the min cardinality s-t cut S of G. A maxmin strategy x of the interceptor,
each edge in S is inspected with probability 1/|S| = 1/cE. Therefore for EPCG
corresponding to G, the payoff of each simple s-t path or equivalently minimum
winning coalition has payoff 1/cE and the minimum excess −ǫ1 of the EPCG is
1/cE − 1.
We note that a similar analysis holds for VPCGs. ⊓⊔
Theorem 4 helps to give a correspondence between EPCG and EPNG and
also between VPCG and VPNG. We note that there is no such correspondence
between, for example EPNG with detection probabilities and C-EPCG. Theo-
rem 4 helps us formulate combinatorial algorithms to compute the least core
of EPCGs and VPCGs (without costs). The problem of computing a least core
payoff reduces to computing a minimum cardinality edge cut (or vertex cut)
of the graph and uniformly distributing the probability over the minimum cut.
Such least core payoffs are the extreme points of the least core convex polytope
and in fact any other least core payoff is a convex combination of the extreme
points.
Our demonstrated connection of EPNGs to the corresponding coalitional
EPCG in the proof of Theorem 4 helps examine refinements of the maxmin
strategies such as the nucleolus.
11
The nucleolus of a coalitional game is the unique and arguably the fairest
solution concept which is guaranteed to lie in the core if the core is non-empty.
The interpretation of the nucleolus in the non-cooperative setting is the maxmin
strategy of the passer which not only minimizes the number of pure best re-
sponses of the interceptor but also maximizes the potential extra payoff if the
interceptor does not choose the optimal strategy. Computing the nucleolus is a
notoriously hard problem and only a handful of non-trivial coalitional games are
known for which the nucleolus can be computed efficiently (see e.g., [1]).
We will show that for certain graph classes like series-parallel graphs, the
nucleolus strategy can be computed in polynomial time (Theorem 5). Series-
parallel graphs are an especially useful class of graphs because they are present
in many settings such as electrical networks, urban grid lay-outs etc.
Definition 10 (Series-parallel graph). Let G = (V,E) be a graph with source
s and sink t. Then G is a series-parallel graph if it may be reduced to K2(a two
vertex clique) by a sequence of the following operations:
1. replacement of a pair of parallel edges by a single edge that connects their
common endpoints;
2. replacement of a pair of edges incident to a vertex of degree 2 other than s
or t by a single edge so that 2 degree vertices get removed.
Denote the set of edge min cuts of a graph G by C(G). Denote by Ce(G) the
set {S ∈ C(G) | e′ ∈ S}.
Lemma 1. For an undirected series-parallel graph G = (V ∪ {s, t}, E), let x
be a least core payoff of the corresponding EPCG and let e ∈ E be such that
Ce(G) = ∅. Then xe = 0.
Proof. Let e = (a, b) ∈ E be such that Ce(G) = ∅ and assume for contradiction
that there is a least core payoff of EPCG for G such that xe > 0. Let the graph
component in series with and left of e be G1, the graph component in series with
and right of e be G2, the graph component in parallel and above e be G3 and
the graph component in parallel below e be G4. Since Ce(G) = ∅ there exists no
edge e′ ∈ G3 ∪G4 such that C′e(G) > 0. Now assume that the mincut value of G
is c∗. The mincut C with size c∗ must either be in G1 or G2. We also know that
since x is a least core payoff, the length of the shortest s-t path in G is 1/c∗. We
show that if xe > 0, then a transfer of payoff from certain edge in G3 ∪G4 ∪ {e}
increases the minimum excess, thereby showing that x is not a least core payoff.
If there exists no shortest a-b path which includes e, then we know that e is
present in no coalition which gets the minimum excess. Therefore e can donate its
payoff uniformly to C and increase the minimum excess by xe/c
∗. Now assume
that e is in one of the shortest a-b paths. Clearly, this is not the only simple
a-b paths because if this were the case then e would be a bridge be one of the
mincuts. We know that mincut value of G3 ∪G4 ∪{e} is more than c∗. Let S be
the minimum cut of G3 ∪G4 ∪ {e}. We know that |S| > |C| = c∗. Then, we can
show that the minimum excess of x increases if x(S) is distributed uniformly
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over C. Each shortest s-t path if Gx has to pass one edge in C and one edge in
S. The the weight of each edge in C has increased by x(S)/|S| and the length
of the shortest a-b has decreased by x(S)/|S|, the excess increases exactly by
positive value x(s)/|C| − x(S)/|S| without decreasing any other excesses. ⊓⊔
Theorem 5. The nucleolus of EPCGs for undirected series-parallel graphs can
be computed in polynomial time.
Proof. We show that the problem of computing the nucleolus of EPCGs of undi-
rected series-parallel graphs reduces to computing the parallel-series decomposi-
tion of the graph. There are known standard algorithms to identify and decom-
pose series-parallel graphs (see e.g., [9]). The reduction is based on an inductive
argument in which if we know the nucleolus of two graphs G′ and G′′, then
we can also compute in polynomial time the nucleolus of the graph made by
connecting G′ and G′′ in series or parallel. The proof by induction is as follows:
Base case: The base case is trivial. In any graphG with a single edge e connecting
s and t, the (pre)nucleolus x gives payoff 1 to e.
Induction: Our induction involves two cases: attaching two graph components
in series and parallel. Consider two series-parallel undirected graphs G′ and G′′
and assume we already know that their nucleoli are x′ and x′′ respectively. We
will show that computing the nucleolus of G formed by joining G′ and G′′ in
series and parallel is polynomial-time easy.
1. Assume we attach G′ and G′′ in series to obtain G. Let the size of any edge
mincut be c′ and any edge mincut be c′′. If c′ < c′′, then by Lemma 1, there
is no advantage of giving payoff to any edges in G′′. Therefore, the nucleolus
of G′ is equal to the nucleolus of G and we are done. Assume that c′ = c′′. We
recall that the nucleolus satisfies anonymity and covariance [14, 19]. Then
due to Lemma 1 and covariance and anonymity property of the nucleolus,
we have x = (αx′, (1 − α)x′′) where 0 < α < 1. Let m′ and m′′ be the
smallest non-zero payoff of a player in x′ and x′′ respectively. We then show
that x = (αx′, (1 − α)x′′) is the nucleolus if α has the unique value for
which m′(α) = m′′(1 − α), i.e., α = m′′/(m′ +m′′). If this were true, then
x = (m′′/(m′ +m′′)x′, (1 −m′′/(m′ +m′′))x′′). In this case, the minimum
excess for x is 1/c′ − 1 and the number of coalitions achieving this in G is
|A| × 2|B| where A is the set number of simple paths in Gx and B = {e ∈
E(G) | Ce(G) = ∅}. We also know that the value of the second minimum
excess is 1/c′−1+(m′ ·m′′)/(m′+m′′). Now assume that there exists another
payoff y = (αx′, (1 − α)x′′) for some α 6= m′′/(m′ +m′′) such that y has a
lexicographically greater excess vector than x. Clearly y is a least core payoff
of G. Then the minimum excess for x is 1/c′− 1 and the number of coalition
achieving this in G is still |A| × 2|B|. However the second minimum excess
for y is less than 1/c′− 1 + (m′ ·m′′)/(m′ +m′′). Therefore, y has a smaller
lexicographical excess vector than x which is a contradiction.
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2. Consider two series-parallel undirected graphs G′ and G′′ and assume we
attach them in parallel to obtain G. Let the size of any edge mincut of G′ be
c′ and the size of any edge mincut of G′′ be c′′. Both the mincut values can be
computed in polynomial time for a graph. We know that the size of mincut of
G is c′+c′′. Then due to Lemma 1 and covariance and anonymity properties
of the nucleolus, we know that x = (αx′, (1 − α)x′′) where 0 < α < 1. We
then show that x = (αx′, (1− α)x′′) is the nucleolus if alpha has the unique
value c′/(c′ + c′′). Since the size of a mincut of G is c′ + c′′, every least core
payoff y of is such that Gy has shortest path 1/(c′+ c′′). We want that every
shortest s-t path which passes from G to have length 1/(c′+c′′). This is only
possible if α = c′/(c′ + c′′).
⊓⊔
We conjecture that a similar approach may help construct a polynomial-time
algorithm to compute the nucleolus of VPCGs for series-parallel graphs.
6 Conclusion
Path coalitional games provide a simple yet rich framework to model strategic
settings in the area of network security and logistics. In this paper we analyzed
different generalizations and variants of path coalitional games and classified the
computational complexity of computing different cooperative and noncoopera-
tive game solutions.4 One key result was a general method to compute least
core payoffs of cost-based generalizations of simple games. Many of our positive
results are based on separation oracles and linear programs. It will be interest-
ing to see if there are purely combinatorial algorithms for the same problems.
Apart from the EPCGs on series-parallel graphs, the complexity of computing
the nucleolus is open for all other games. For all variants of path coalitional
games, we assumed that each edge/vertex is owned by a separate player. It will
be interesting to see if our positive results can be extended to the more general
scenario where a single player may own more than one edge or vertex.
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